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SIX DEGREES OF GRADUATION:  
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF  
VARIABLE SANCTIONS 
ALEX RASKOLNIKOV* 
ABSTRACT 
From parking tickets to tax fines and punitive damages, legal sanctions matter in people’s 
lives. Yet neither the legal nor the economics literature offers a comprehensive treatment of 
sanctions. Their practical complexity is not well understood, and their theoretical analysis is 
fragmented. This Essay addresses both limitations using tax law as a primary example. Sanc-
tions are complex because they vary along at least six different dimensions: aggressiveness, 
magnitude, culpability, effort to comply, likelihood of detection, and offense history. These six 
degrees of sanction graduation are distinct, and potentially independent, but often inter-
twined in obscure and perplexing ways. After clarifying the unique nature of each degree (or 
axis) of graduation, this Essay reviews the literature in search of the economic rationale for 
varying sanctions along each axis in light of the incentives such variation creates. I conclude 
that three graduation axes of great practical significance—aggressiveness, culpability, and 
offense history—are the least developed theoretically. Two other dimensions—the likelihood 
of detection and the effort to comply with the law—are more conceptually advanced, although 
the theory is still fairly removed from the enforcement realities. In contrast, economic analysis 
reveals a good grasp of the magnitude axis and a clear path to modelling the real-life features 
that have remained overlooked thus far. By highlighting the complexity of sanctioning re-
gimes and emphasizing the related theoretical successes and shortcomings, this Essay iden-
tifies fruitful areas of future research, some of which I pursue in related work. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
If one believes that people respond to incentives, legal sanctions are 
just as important as legal rules. Get one wrong and the legal regime 
fails no matter how well the other one is designed. Yet with few excep-
tions, the economic analysis of law has paid little attention to sanc-
tions. This lack of interest would be understandable if sanctions could 
                                                                                                                  
 * The original version of this Essay appeared as Alex Raskolnikov, Six Degrees of 
Graduation: Law and Economics of Variable Sanctions, in TAX SIMPLIFICATION at 205 (Chris 
Evans et al. eds., 2015). It is reproduced with permission of the publisher and is available at 
http://www.wklawbusiness.com/. I am grateful to workshop participants at Columbia Uni-
versity, Harvard University, and University of Washington law schools, the 2014 Tax Sys-
tem Complexity Symposium, the Tax Club, the Tax Forum, and the 2013 annual meeting of 
the National Tax Association for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support 
from the Gerber Program is gratefully acknowledged. All mistakes are solely my own. 
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only be designed in a limited number of ways, or if the actual sanctions 
were simple and uniform. Neither is true, however. Sanctions can and 
do vary a great deal along a number of dimensions. Do these variations 
make sense? Are they consistent with plausible assumptions about in-
dividual decision-making? Are they likely to improve efficiency or fa-
cilitate compliance? Strange as it may sound, the economic analysis of 
law is not close to answering these questions. 
This Essay highlights the complexity of sanctioning regimes and 
our limited understanding of the resulting incentives, using tax pen-
alties as a primary example. Several reasons make tax law a good case 
study. The actual tax penalties are complex. They are endlessly de-
bated by practitioners and frequently adjusted by rulemakers. And 
they have been scrutinized by legal academics and economists more 
extensively than penalties for many other regulatory violations. In tax, 
enforcement is always a “hot topic.” So it is particularly useful to con-
sider how the real-life tax enforcement machinery reflects—or fails to 
reflect—theoretical insights. 
This Essay has a simple structure. Part II explains what I mean by 
sanctions complexity and identifies six dimensions (or axes) along 
which penalties may vary. These are the six degrees of sanctions grad-
uation. While I use U.S. tax penalties as an example, the analysis is 
neither U.S.- nor tax-specific. Any enforcement regime may exhibit 
each of the six degrees of graduation, and many actually contain more 
than one graduation axis. Part III summarizes and evaluates the eco-
nomic rationales for varying sanctions along each axis of graduation. 
Again, these rationales are not limited to any regulatory area. Alt-
hough tax enforcement literature is relatively rich in its analysis of 
various enforcement factors, studies that are not tax-specific offer val-
uable insights as well. I conclude that the three graduation axes of 
great practical significance—aggressiveness, culpability, and offense 
history—are the least developed theoretically. Two other dimen-
sions—the likelihood of detection and the effort to comply with the 
law—are more conceptually advanced. Even there, however, the the-
ory is fairly removed from the realities of tax enforcement. In contrast, 
economic analysis reveals a good grasp of the magnitude axis and a 
clear path to modeling the real-life features that have remained over-
looked thus far. By highlighting the complexity of sanctioning regimes  
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and emphasizing the related theoretical successes and shortcomings, 
this Essay identifies fruitful areas of future research, some of which I 
pursue in related work. 
II.   SIX DEGREES OF SANCTIONS GRADUATION 
There are many ways to define complexity.1 For the purposes of this 
inquiry, sanctions are more complex if they vary along a greater num-
ber of legally relevant dimensions—if they have more degrees of grad-
uation. For instance, a sanction that depends on the magnitude of lost 
profits is less complex than a sanction that depends on that magnitude 
and also on the putative offender’s state of mind. That latter sanction, 
in turn, is less complex than the one that depends on the same two 
factors and also on the offender’s effort to conceal the violation. Saying 
that sanctions determined only by the size of lost profits are not com-
plex does not mean that calculating lost profits is a trivial matter. But 
making this determination plus the other two clearly places higher de-
mands on decision-makers and complicates the incentives of potential 
offenders. 
Most discussions of legal sanctions recognize that sanctions often 
vary along a certain dimension. Commentators frequently state that 
acts that are more aggressive, egregious, reprehensible, and the like 
are subject to a greater punishment. These terms, however, have no 
accepted meanings. The term “egregious,” for instance, has been used 
to refer to acts that are particularly harmful,2 especially culpable,3 art-
fully concealed,4 or reveal a great departure from community norms.5 
Needless to say, one cannot analyze a graduated penalty regime with-
out a precise understanding of a particular axis of graduation. Many 
different axes may and do exist, and tax sanctions vary along all of 
them. 
To a legal analyst, the most important dimension is what lawyers 
call aggressiveness of a particular act or position.6 Aggressiveness is 
                                                                                                                  
 1. David Bradford, for instance, spoke of rule complexity, compliance complexity, and 
transactional complexity. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 
(1999). 
 2. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-66 (1993). 
 3. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
 4. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analy-
sis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998). 
 5. See Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
79, 89 (1982). 
 6. This use of the term “aggressiveness” is well established in tax law scholarship. See 
Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5 (2000); Mark P. 
Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 275 (2002); 
Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. 
TAX REV. 241, 251 (2007); Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administra-
tion, 66 TAX L. REV. 121, 144-45 (2012); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under 
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the extent to which one’s behavior deviates from legally permissible 
conduct. Thus, if a speed limit is 55 mph, driving at 60 mph is a less 
aggressive speeding violation than driving at 90 mph. If the standard 
is reasonable care, negligent behavior is less aggressive than a grossly 
negligent action, which itself is less aggressive than a reckless action. 
And if the statute outlaws “restraint[s] of trade,”7 an exchange of pric-
ing information among competitors is a less aggressive action than a 
general discussion of a possible cooperation in setting prices, which, in 
turn, is less aggressive than a written agreement establishing a secret 
cartel.8 The last two examples highlight the relationship between ag-
gressiveness and legal uncertainty. What care is “reasonable”? What 
actions “restrain” trade?9 Law is full of similarly vague terms, and tax 
law is no exception. When the meaning of the law is uncertain, more 
aggressive acts have a higher likelihood of being found to violate the 
law. Aggressiveness, therefore, is closely related to the probability of 
legal punishment. 
Because more aggressive acts are more likely to be sanctioned, even 
a fixed statutory fine yields higher expected penalties for more aggres-
sive violations. Sometimes, however, statutory fines themselves vary 
with aggressiveness. Speeding fines are the most familiar example. 
                                                                                                                  
Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2008); David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: 
Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2000); 
Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate 
Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 230-31 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008); 
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 88, 107 (2002). The accountancy literature often uses the term aggressiveness in a  
similar manner. See Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayers’ Reporting Decisions and Au-
diting Under Information Asymmetry, 64 ACCT. REV. 468, 474-75 (1989); Michelle  
Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127, 137 (2010); 
Peggy A. Hite & Gary A. McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for Aggressive Tax 
Advice, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 389, 389 & 400 n.3 (1992); Petro Lisowsky et al., Do Publicly Dis-
closed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity?, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 
583, 590 (2013). Economists occasionally refer to “aggressiveness” to convey the same or sim-
ilar concept. See Kate Krause, Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity?, 28 PUB. FIN. REV. 
395, 396 (2000). I use the term “aggressiveness” rather than degree of “fault”—the term typ-
ically used in the general optimal deterrence analysis. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Ste-
ven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 403, 407 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). I do so both to reflect 
the customary use in the tax literature and to avoid moral connotations of the latter term. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 8. The legality of price information exchanges has long been a subject of debate. See 
Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers 
Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1198 (1979). 
 9. The Supreme Court has long held that not only must there be a “restraint” of trade 
(itself an unclear term) to produce an antitrust violation, but that the restraint must be 
“unreasonable” as well. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984). 
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Greater speeds in excess of the speed limit lead to higher fines.10 The 
same is true of particularly serious violations of environmental regu-
lations.11 But no regulatory regime that I am aware of comes close to 
tax in the degree of refinement of the aggressiveness-based penalty 
graduation. 
Instead of presenting this feature of tax sanctions in all its splen-
dor,12 the following summary gives only a glimpse of the nuance and 
complexity involved. If a judge in a U.S. tax case decides that a tax-
payer underpaid taxes, the judge then needs to address the penalty 
issue. Whether the penalties are due, and how high they ought to be, 
depends on the judge’s ex post evaluation of the ex ante strength of the 
taxpayer’s position. “Strength” is yet another term that lawyers often 
use in reference to the likelihood of success on the merits, with 
stronger (less aggressive) positions being more likely to succeed than 
weaker (more aggressive) ones. Civil tax penalties vary from zero to 
75% of the tax underpayment (with the intermediate values of 20%, 
30%, and 40%) depending on whether the position is “more likely than 
not” to be correct, or is supported by a “substantial authority,” or at 
least has a “reasonable basis,” or, worse yet, is just a “colorable claim,” 
is merely not “frivolous,” or not “patently improper.”13 Much ink has 
been spilled debating whether this or that tax position satisfies one of 
these thresholds, and whether this or that fine percentage should cor-
respond to a particular level of aggressiveness. Thus, aggressiveness 
(or strength) of a legal position is an important axis of penalty gradu-
ation, especially in tax. 
The review of aggressiveness-based tax penalties reveals the second 
axis of graduation. All penalties just described are calculated as a per-
centage of a tax underpayment rather than a fixed dollar amount. The 
higher the underpayment, the higher the penalty. So tax sanctions de-
pend on the magnitude of the underpayment. Thus, magnitude is an-
other axis of graduation present in tax and many other regulatory re-
gimes. Tax, however, reveals a rather complex magnitude-based grad-
uation scheme. Some tax sanctions increase disproportionately with 
the size of the underpayment. For instance, a penalty for a “substan-
tial valuation misstatement” is 20% of the misstated amount.14 This 
                                                                                                                  
 10. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 20 (West, Westlaw through ch. 171 of the 
2015 1st Annual Session and Ch. 5, except for Ch. 1, of the 2016 2nd Annual Session) (im-
posing increasing fines for greater speeds in excess of the speed limit). 
 11. See RCRA ENF’T DIV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RCRA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 18 
(2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf. 
 12. For thorough reviews, see Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 118-19 (2009); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax 
Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1050 (2009); Logue, supra note 6, at 256. 
 13. I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6664 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003). 
 14. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b). 
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means, of course, that greater misstatements lead to higher penalties. 
If, however, a misstatement is particularly large (“gross” rather than 
“substantial”), the penalty rises to 40% of the misstated amount.15 This 
disproportionate increase in sanctions for particularly large misstate-
ments produces additional magnitude-based graduation of penalties.16 
Punitive damages (when conceived as either applicable or appropriate 
for particularly great external harms) are the most well-known exam-
ple of this additional magnitude-based graduation. There are others.17 
As soon as we recognize two different axes of graduation, it is im-
portant to emphasize that they may be independent. A taxpayer may 
engage in outright evasion of a ten-dollar tax liability (high aggres-
siveness; small magnitude) or take an uncertain but rather conserva-
tive position saving a million dollars in taxes (low aggressiveness; high 
magnitude). Of course, one may evade a million dollars in tax (high 
aggressiveness, high magnitude) or take a conservative ten-dollar de-
duction (low aggressiveness, small magnitude). The potential inde-
pendence of behavioral variation along the two axes underscores an 
important point: it is essential to be clear about which particular axis 
of graduation one investigates. If a given term such as “egregious” is 
used to describe both aggressiveness and magnitude—as it sometimes 
is—confusion is inevitable. Thus, recognizing just two degrees of grad-
uation highlights the importance of conceptual precision. 
Culpability, or the offender’s mental state, is the third degree of 
graduation. This axis is most relevant in criminal law, where punish-
ment often depends on whether the defendant acted with reckless dis-
regard, knowledge, intent, or specific intent (which itself has multiple 
levels). Purpose, willfulness, scienter, and similar concepts all reflect 
various points on the culpability axis. Conceptually, culpability is just 
a subset of aggressiveness-based graduation where the relevant legal 
threshold is the actor’s state of mind. One may think of culpability as 
mental aggressiveness. Nonetheless, graduation along this axis de-
serves a separate treatment because changes in aggressiveness and 
culpability are often independent of each other. 
Tax penalties offer many examples of culpability-based graduation. 
Numerous tax provisions deny tax benefits (and raise the specter of 
sanctions) if a taxpayer acts with “a principal purpose,”18 “the principal 
                                                                                                                  
 15. See I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1). 
 16. The same magnitude-based graduation applies to overstatements of pension liabil-
ities and estate or gift tax valuation understatements. See id. § 6662(a), (b)(4)-(5), (h)(2)(B)-
(C). Moreover, the “valuation misstatement” penalty results in another disproportionate mag-
nitude-based increase as the size of an understatement changes from insubstantial (and not 
subject to that penalty) to “substantial” (and penalized at 20% of the understatement). 
 17. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2012) (es-
tablishing increased “third-tier” sanctions for violations that “result[] in substantial losses”). 
 18. I.R.C. § 382(l)(1)(A). 
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purpose,”19 “a significant purpose,”20 or just “a purpose”21 of tax avoid-
ance or evasion. All of the quoted terms refer to mental states, and 
each means a different degree of intentionality.22 For losing tax posi-
tions, sanctions vary depending on whether the underpayment is “will-
ful”23 and whether a taxpayer acted with “willful neglect.”24 The eco-
nomic substance doctrine conditions tax benefits on the taxpayer’s 
state of mind as well.25 This is particularly important because the pen-
alty increases from 20% to 40% for underpayments that result from 
transactions lacking economic substance.26 Thus, culpability is an im-
portant factor in determining sanctions for tax law violations. 
It is well known that an act (more precisely, an act of a given ag-
gressiveness) may be subject to civil or criminal sanctions, or no sanc-
tions at all, depending on the offender’s state of mind.27 Less under-
stood, perhaps, is the fact that a more aggressive conduct can be less 
culpable and vice versa. Tax law provides ready examples. A losing tax 
position taken intentionally and with full knowledge that it is more 
likely to be illegal than legal is not subject to any sanctions as long as 
it is not too aggressive (has “substantial authority”) (high culpability, 
moderate aggressiveness).28 Another position taken with no knowledge 
or intent to evade the law that happens to be more aggressive (has only 
a “reasonable basis”) is subject to fines if not disclosed (low culpability, 
high aggressiveness).29 Of course, aggressiveness and culpability may 
vary in tandem as well. One may intentionally evade (high culpability, 
high aggressiveness), or comply while intending to do so (low culpabil-
ity, low aggressiveness). And it is equally apparent that culpability 
and magnitude may vary independently in almost every legal regime. 
                                                                                                                  
 19. Id. § 269(b)(1)(D). 
 20. Id. § 6662(d)(C)(ii). 
 21. Id. § 357(b)(1)(A). 
 22. For a seminal discussion, see Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal 
Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
 23. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 7B.02 
(2013). 
 24. I.R.C. § 6651(a). 
 25. Specifically, the courts must inquire into whether the taxpayer had a “non-tax busi-
ness purpose.” See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in Federal Income 
Taxation: The Year 2011, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 235, 364 (2012). 
 26. See I.R.C. § 6662(i)(1). 
 27. For a detailed analysis of a wide range of such acts, see Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeem-
ably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133 (2014). 
 28. A position is generally believed to have “substantial authority” if it has at least a 
40% chance of success on review. No penalties apply to such positions even if the taxpayer 
was convinced that the likelihood of success was less than fifty-fifty. For a discussion and 
critique of this feature, see Doran, supra note 12, at 118-19 & tbl.1. 
 29. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B). “Reasonable basis” is generally viewed as about a 25% 
chance of success on review. For a discussion, see Logue, supra note 6. 
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Thus, we have now identified three separate axes of penalty gradua-
tion, all potentially independent, and all present in the tax setting. 
The fourth axis is the degree of care taken by a putative offender to 
comply with the law. Tax penalties, for example, depend on whether 
taxpayer’s actions reveal “negligence or disregard of rules or regula-
tions,” where “the term ‘negligence’ includes any failure to make a rea-
sonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title, and the 
term ‘disregard’ includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disre-
gard.”30 Notably, these provisions do not focus on aggressiveness (or, 
at least, not only on aggressiveness). Rather, they depend on “tax-
payer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability,”31 such as by 
ascertaining the rules, making inquiries, and the like.32 Perhaps the 
most important decision in that regard is whether to obtain expert ad-
vice. The importance is due both to cost considerations and to the legal 
consequences of the decision.33 I will refer to this axis of penalty grad-
uation as effort. 
While it is probably obvious that effort is distinct from magnitude, 
it may be less clear that effort is different from aggressiveness and 
culpability. Yet it is. Starting with aggressiveness, it may seem intui-
tive that if one ignores the law one will end up breaking some rules. 
Low effort, one may think, leads to high aggressiveness (and high ef-
fort to low aggressiveness). Perhaps sometimes it does; but other times 
it does not. One may just happen to take a conservative tax position 
while making no effort to understand the relevant rules (low effort, low 
aggressiveness). One may also take an aggressive “reasonable basis” 
position after engaging expert advisors and while retaining all the rel-
evant records (high effort, high aggressiveness). Effort and culpability 
may diverge as well. One taxpayer may learn the law and then delib-
erately break it anyway (high effort, high culpability). Another tax-
payer may fail to comply with an obscure rule that the taxpayer made 
no effort to understand because the taxpayer was unaware of the rule’s  
  
                                                                                                                  
 30. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c). 
 31. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 32. Similarly, sanctions for violating the Securities Exchange Act increase if the of-
fender exhibits a “deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 33. In many cases, reliance on professional advice immunizes the taxpayer from penal-
ties. In some cases it does not. There has been much litigation on this issue, including re-
cently. See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 23, ¶ 7B.03. 
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existence (low effort, low culpability). A third taxpayer may work hard 
to understand a legal command, but make an innocent mistake (high 
effort, low culpability). More scenarios may be readily imagined. 
Without claiming to identify all possible axes of penalty graduation, 
I will highlight two more. The likelihood of detection is a well-known 
variable in the deterrence literature. Not surprisingly, sanctions may 
vary along this dimension, and tax sanctions do vary in that manner. 
For instance, losing positions supported by a “reasonable basis” are 
penalty-free if they are disclosed, but not otherwise.34 Transactions 
lacking economic substance are subject to a 20% or 40% penalty de-
pending on whether a taxpayer discloses them on a return (with a 
higher penalty applying to non-disclosed transactions).35 And efforts to 
conceal a tax underpayment make an imposition of a fraud penalty 
more likely.36 At the risk of stating the obvious, I will note that the 
detection axis is potentially independent from aggressiveness, culpa-
bility, magnitude, or effort. As the number of axes increases, it be-
comes burdensome to give examples showing all possible combina-
tions. But just to raise a few possibilities, one taxpayer taking a some-
what aggressive position may try to hide it while another may not. In 
each case, the amount of underpayment may be large or small, and the 
same is true of a taxpayer’s effort to ascertain what the law requires. 
Finally, sanctions may and do vary based on the offender’s history 
of prior violations. This history axis is very familiar in criminal law. 
Criminal tax penalties increase with the number of prior offenses,37 
just like most other criminal sanctions do under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.38 At the same time, lack of prior criminal history is a mit-
igating factor in tax evasion sentencing.39 Offense history is important 
for civil penalties as well. For example, a penalty for failure to disclose 
a reportable transaction may be rescinded if a “taxpayer has an estab-
lished history of properly disclosing other reportable transactions and 
complying with other tax laws.”40 Similarly, a penalty for failure to file 
certain returns is increased if the taxpayer’s offense “is part of a  
pattern of conduct . . . of repeatedly failing to file timely or repeatedly  
  
                                                                                                                  
 34. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2). 
 35. See id. § 6662(i)(1). 
 36. See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 23, ¶ 7B.02[4][a]. 
 37. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.5.1 cmt. background (U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n 2015).  
 38. See id. at ch. 4-5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 39. See United States v. Moore, 344 F. App’x 767, 769 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
 40. Treas. Reg. § 301.6707A-1(d)(3)(B)(iii) (as amended in 2011). 
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failing to include correct information” on the return.41 As is probably 
obvious, the offense history may be independent from any of the other 
five graduation axes. 
I have repeatedly qualified the point about the independent varia-
tion along each of the six axes with terms like “potentially” and “often” 
for a reason. While sanctions may vary independently along each axis, 
policymakers may make the variations interdependent as well. Again, 
tax provides some stark examples. A tax understatement is subject to 
sanctions if it is “substantial” but not otherwise.42 “Substantiality” is 
determined by the size of the understatement, revealing magnitude-
based graduation.43 However, a taxpayer who discloses the relevant 
information on the return is not viewed as understating any tax.44 
Thus, the rule intertwines magnitude-based and detection-based grad-
uation. But this is not the end of the story. A disclosed position does 
not count as being disclosed if it is not supported by a “reasonable ba-
sis” (aggressiveness-based threshold), or is not properly substantiated 
(effort-based threshold), or is attributable to a tax shelter.45 The last 
clause introduces a culpability-based threshold because a “tax shelter” 
is defined by reference to a taxpayer’s purpose for entering into the 
transaction.46 In sum, the substantial understatement penalty—a rule 
that takes less than a quarter of a page in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations—blends together thresholds reflecting five (!) different axes of 
graduation, leaving only the offense history out of the picture. Is it any 
wonder that tax lawyers make a nice living explaining tax law to the 
uninitiated? 
Why are tax sanctions so complicated? Does it make sense to vary 
penalties along so many different dimensions? What assumptions 
about people’s behavior support any of these variations? Which grad-
uated penalty structures are likely to improve efficiency or facilitate 
compliance? The next Part searches for answers to these questions  
in the legal, economics, and accounting literature on tax compliance 
and optimal deterrence more generally. The inquiry is limited to  
economic analysis, and it follows the order in which the degrees of 
graduation appeared above: aggressiveness, magnitude, culpability,  
  
                                                                                                                  
 41. Id. § 301.6721-1(f)(3)(i) (as amended in 2014).  
 42. See id. § 1.6662-4(a) (as amended in 2003). 
 43. Specifically, “substantial” means in excess of the greater of 10% of the correct 
amount of tax or $5000, with some further complications. See id. § 1.6662-4(b). 
 44. See id. § 1.6662-4(e)(1). 
 45. Id. § 1.6662-4(e)(2). 
 46. A tax shelter is “(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or ar-
rangement, (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose . . . is the avoidance 
or evasion of Federal income tax.” I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). 
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effort, detection, and history. I do not claim that these are the only 
possible axes, but I believe that they are the most important ones as a 
practical matter. Thus I limit the discussion to these six. 
III.   EVALUATING GRADUATED SANCTIONS 
Multiple axes of penalty graduation do not necessarily make pen-
alty calculations difficult. As one can glean from the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, these calculations may be quite mechanistic. “For each dol-
lar of tax underpayment, add ten cents,” the rules may say, “for each 
prior offense, multiply by 1.3; for lack of disclosure, raise to a square,” 
and so on. In reality, however, simple schemes like this are rarely pos-
sible. Aggressiveness, culpability, and effort are vague concepts that 
may not be defined precisely or applied easily most of the time. More-
over, the history of the Sentencing Guidelines suggests that even the 
sanctioning characteristics that do lend themselves to a precise defini-
tion and predictable application violate our sense of justice, or at least 
that of the U.S. Supreme Court.47 These difficulties, however, are only 
a small part of the problem with complex sanctions. From a theoretical 
perspective, each degree of penalty graduation requires an independ-
ent investigation and justification. The more degrees there are, the 
more analysis is needed to evaluate a penalty regime. The following 
discussion turns to this analysis. 
A.   Aggressiveness: Critical in Law; Overlooked in Economics 
Law is often uncertain, and people respond to this uncertainty in 
different ways. Some stay on the safe side, others come close to the 
blurry line separating legal and illegal conduct, and there are those 
who completely disregard the law’s commands. These variations are 
important in any legal regime, but they are particularly important in 
tax and other settings where statutory fines depend on the actor’s 
choice of aggressiveness. Needless to say, one cannot evaluate this 
penalty structure without having a model of actors responding to legal 
uncertainty by taking positions of varying legal strength. 
Yet the literature has little to offer in modeling legal uncertainty. 
Although this uncertainty has received more attention in tax than in 
many other contexts, most economic analysis of tax enforcement ig-
nores legal uncertainty altogether. There is not even a term describing 
uncertain tax positions. The standard approach in the economic anal-
                                                                                                                  
 47. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that mandatory Sen-
tencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
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ysis of tax enforcement allows only two choices: evasion and compli-
ance (called “avoidance” by most economists).48 While decision-making 
under uncertainty is at the core of this approach, the uncertainty re-
lates to detection, not the strength of a legal position.49 
Some work in economics and accounting does incorporate legal un-
certainty into tax compliance models. However, most of this work does 
not interpret legal uncertainty in the way I do here. Several authors 
conceptualize uncertainty as a random variation of taxable income 
around the mean.50 Their analyses do not incorporate the concept of 
aggressiveness, do not consider uncertainty-dependent penalties, and 
do not investigate any specific rules. Moreover, their models operation-
alize an increase in uncertainty as an increase in a mean-preserving 
spread.51 In contrast, a change in aggressiveness changes the mean as 
well as the variance. Another approach views uncertainty as a tax-
payer’s lack of knowledge of the tax consequences. This ignorance may 
                                                                                                                  
 48. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, 
in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1428 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein 
eds., 2002). 
 49. The foundational model by Allingham and Sandmo incorporated only detection un-
certainty, and the literature mostly followed this approach. See generally Michael G. Alling-
ham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 
(1972). Curiously, even though Allingham and Sandmo acknowledged that other forms of 
uncertainty exist and briefly discussed these other forms, they said nothing about legal un-
certainty in that discussion. Id. at 324-25. 
 50. See Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (1989); Woon-Oh Jung, Tax Reporting Game Under Uncertain Tax 
Laws and Asymmetric Information, 37 ECON. LETTERS 323, 323-24 (1991); Louis Kaplow, 
Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 61, 72 (1998); Suzanne 
Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17, 19 (1989). 
 51. See James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 237, 238 (1988); Beck & Jung, supra note 50, at 10-11; Kaplow, supra note 50, 
at 75; Scotchmer & Slemrod, supra note 50, at 19. 
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be reduced or eliminated by learning the rules or acquiring tax ad-
vice.52 In contrast, legal uncertainty is often irreducible. In fact, ac-
quiring tax advice may increase it.53 Other economic models of uncer-
tainty are even further removed from this Essay’s conceptualization of 
this term.54 
A few investigations by economists and accountants do use the term 
legal uncertainty as I use it here. David Ulph offers a model that in-
cludes taxpayers who face uncertain rules and purchase tax schemes 
of various aggressiveness.55 However, one of his model’s main driv-
ers—the risk of retroactive legislation—is not a serious concern for 
U.S. taxpayers.56 Other features of the model lead to further difficul-
ties in applying it to real-life tax planning.57 Paul Beck, Jon Davis, and 
Woon-Oh Jung investigate legal uncertainty and variation in tax re-
porting aggressiveness in a series of articles.58 Kate Krause models a 
                                                                                                                  
 52. See Beck & Jung, supra note 50, at 13-14; Kaplow, supra note 50, at 74-75, 78; 
Krause, supra note 6, at 399; Suzanne Scotchmer, Who Profits from Taxpayer Confusion?, 
29 ECON. LETTERS 49, 49-50 (1989). Some of the contributions expressly set aside the inves-
tigation of “arguability” (i.e., legal uncertainty) of legal positions. See Scotchmer, supra, at 
51. Note that uncertainty as lack of knowledge and uncertainty as a random variation 
around the mean are not mutually exclusive. One can model uncertainty as a random vari-
ation with taxpayers capable of reducing the distribution’s variance by acquiring  
information. 
 53. For instance, a taxpayer may be aware of a “home office” deduction and may think 
that a “home office” means something like “a room in the house where the taxpayer works 
when he or she works at home.” Asking an expert about this deduction would complicate 
things quite a bit. To start with, it would introduce the taxpayer to a detailed regulatory 
scheme in section 280A. While the tax advisor may be an expert in interpreting this section 
(so that the taxpayer need not master it), the advisor will also explain that some key statu-
tory terms are ambiguous and the guidance from the courts has been far from clear. See 1 
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 
¶ 22.6.3 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the controversy regarding the “principal place of business” 
term). 
 54. James Alm, for example, investigates uncertainty that arises due to possible future 
legislative changes. See Alm, supra note 51, at 237, 241. Under the current law, this possi-
bility affects neither the aggressiveness of a particular tax position nor the possible  
penalties. 
 55. Ulph uses the term “legal effectiveness” rather than aggressiveness. See David 
Ulph, Avoidance Policies—A New Conceptual Framework 1, 7 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. 
Taxation, Working Paper No. 09/22, 2009). 
 56. See Ulph, supra note 55, at 8-20 (discussing variables pu and φ). Another key driver 
is the variation in reputational costs. See id. at 10. Yet we know very little about the magni-
tude of these costs and their variation among taxpayers. 
 57. For instance, the model assumes that the “probability that the tax authority suc-
cessfully challenge[s] the scheme” does not vary among schemes or taxpayers. Id. at 9-10. 
Not only is this assumption unrealistic, the variation of probability in question is a key factor 
accounting for variation in aggressiveness of real-life tax positions. 
 58. See Paul J. Beck et al., Experimental Evidence on an Economic Model of Taxpayer 
Aggression Under Strategic and Nonstrategic Audits, 9 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 86 (1992) [here-
inafter Beck et al., Strategic Audits]; Paul J. Beck et al., Experimental Evidence on Taxpayer 
Reporting Under Uncertainty, 66 ACCT. REV. 535 (1991) [hereinafter Beck et al., Reporting 
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parameter that may be interpreted as the level of aggressiveness as 
well.59 Lillian Mills, Leslie Robinson, and Richard Sansing present a 
model where taxpayers of varying aggressiveness face uncertain tax 
rules.60 And Michael Graetz, Jennifer Reinganum, and Louis Wilde in-
vestigate the effect of tax advice on decisions of taxpayers facing dif-
fering probability that their deductions would be disallowed (which the 
authors call “exposure”).61 None of these models, however, investigates 
aggressiveness as an endogenous variable. Beck and co-authors intro-
duce aggressiveness as a “prior probability”62 of success and operation-
alize it in experimental settings by assigning a number reflecting this 
probability to the subjects.63 Mills and co-authors equate the strength 
of a position with the taxpayer type, which the taxpayer “observes” as 
a “realization of a random variable.”64 Graetz and co-authors do not 
allow taxpayers to change their exposure levels.65 Krause imposes the 
same restriction on the levels of a tax position’s ambiguity.66 
Yet from a lawyer’s perspective, the most important feature of ag-
gressiveness is that it is endogenous. Taxpayers may vary the strength 
of their positions from certain legality to certain illegality by adjusting 
                                                                                                                  
Under Uncertainty]; Paul J. Beck et al., Tax Advice and Reporting Under Uncertainty: The-
ory and Experimental Evidence, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 49 (1996) [hereinafter Beck et al., 
Tax Advice]; Paul J. Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 
THEORY 243 (2000) [hereinafter Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure]; Beck & Jung, supra  
note 50.  
 59. See Krause, supra note 6, at 400. 
 60. See Lillian F. Mills et al., FIN 48 and Tax Compliance, 85 ACCT. REV. 1721, 1726-
27 (2010) (introducing x as the expected tax benefit from the transaction, but also referring 
to it as the “strength” of a taxpayer’s position, and interpreting x ≥ 0.5 as a position “for 
which the taxpayer is more likely than not to prevail”).  
 61. See Michael Graetz et al., Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Strategic 
Analysis 5 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 710, 1989). 
 62. Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure, supra note 58, at 247 (emphasis added). 
 63. See Beck et al., Strategic Audits, supra note 58, at 98. For another experimental 
operationalization of exogenous uncertainty and aggressiveness, see Beck et al., Reporting 
Under Uncertainty, supra note 58, at 538 (introducing experimental subjects to income un-
certainty as a bingo case with sequentially numbered balls representing particular taxable 
incomes and varying the number of balls in the bingo cage). Beck and co-authors model the 
strength of a legal position as the probability that the taxpayer’s income is high (because, for 
example, a tax deduction may not be properly taken). See Beck et al., Strategic Audits, supra 
note 58, at 89. Because their model does not allow that strength (probability) to vary, the 
authors vary aggressiveness by manipulating the gap between high and low incomes—some-
thing they themselves tend to refer to as the “amount at risk” rather than the degree of 
aggressiveness. See id.; see also Beck et al., Tax Advice, supra note 58, at 49. 
 64. Mills et al., supra note 60, at 1727, 1729. 
 65. See Graetz et al., supra note 61, at 7 (listing a number of strategies available to 
taxpayers, but not considering a strategy of changing the exposure, π). 
 66. See Krause, supra note 6, at 401 (considering three potential taxpayer responses to 
uncertainty, but not considering changing e1 as a possible additional strategy). Rather, 
Krause considers how exogenous changes in tax position’s ambiguity affect taxpayer incen-
tives. See id. at 404-05. 
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their actions. For instance, it is unclear what a “substantial”67 decline 
in risk is, but it is abundantly clear that a 99% decline is substantial 
and a 1% decline is not. Taxpayers may often choose any degree of risk 
diminution between 100% and zero in designing their tax reduction 
strategies. Likewise, even if a taxpayer is unsure how much time must 
pass for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to conclude that a later 
event has followed the earlier one “immediately,”68 there is no doubt 
that a minute-long gap between the two satisfies the test and a year-
long gap does not. Again, taxpayers may often choose the length of 
time separating the two events. Thus, the aggressiveness of many tax 
positions is endogenous—it is the product of taxpayer’s choice. No 
work in accounting or economics of tax compliance that I am aware of 
reflects this feature of aggressiveness.69 That is, no model incorporates 
the case where a change in the taxpayer’s behavior affects the strength 
of that person’s tax position.70 
Legal scholars fully appreciate the role of aggressiveness in taxa-
tion and taxpayers’ ability to vary it. Their analysis of tax penalties is 
highly illuminating, but it has significant limitations. Sarah Lawsky 
suggests that aggressiveness-based graduation of tax sanctions may 
be appropriate, but her arguments suffer from several problems. 71 
First, her model is a narrower version of Louis Kaplow’s model that, 
                                                                                                                  
 67. I.R.C. § 1092(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 68. Id. § 351(a).  
 69. Note that the models interpreting income uncertainty as a random variation around 
the mean do incorporate endogeneity by allowing taxpayers to reduce uncertainty by pur-
chasing tax advice. See, e.g., Beck & Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, supra 
note 50, at 13-16. However, a change in uncertainty in these models amounts to a change in 
the mean-preserving variance of an income distribution, see id. at 14, not a change in the 
mean of a distribution that would correspond to positions of different aggressiveness. 
 70. James Alm and Mark Cronshaw offer a model that includes a parameter (α) defined 
as “the probability that a high-income taxpayer reports low (i.e., the probability of noncom-
pliance or cheating).” Mark B. Cronshaw & James Alm, Tax Compliance with Two-Sided 
Uncertainty, 23 PUB. FIN. Q. 139, 144 (1995). Importantly, the taxpayer in the model is free 
to choose the value of α, making it endogenous. See id. It is unclear, however, what this 
probability corresponds to in real life, that is, how a taxpayer may choose this probability. 
Aside from an inquiry into legal uncertainty, the tax enforcement literature does address 
endogenous probabilities. For instance, Yitzhaki considers probability of detection that de-
pends on the amount of evaded income which is chosen by the taxpayer. See Shlomo Yitzhaki, 
On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 123, 127 (1987). Kaplow investigates 
the variation in the probability of detection due to the taxpayers’ expenditures on concealing 
their evasion. See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 
43 J. PUB. ECON. 221, 230 (1990). These investigations, however, do not link the endogenous 
uncertainty to the aggressiveness of a tax position. Therefore, they do not shed light on the 
aggressiveness-based penalty graduation. 
 71. See generally Lawsky, supra note 12. 
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in Kaplow’s own view, does not yield any specific prescription for sanc-
tions design.72 Second, Kaplow’s model is inapplicable in the tax set-
ting because it is built on a foundational assumption that “[i]f and only 
if an act is harmful is it illegal.”73 This assumption is implausible in 
the tax field.74 Third, Lawsky replaces Kaplow’s “probability of harm”75 
with “lawmakers’ perceived probability of harm (i.e., lawmakers’ esti-
mation of the probability that the transaction would be struck down 
by a court if reviewed).”76 It is unclear how lawmakers may estimate 
the likely outcomes of future legal decisions regarding yet-unknown 
tax positions. 
Kyle Logue does not investigate a continuous aggressiveness-based 
variation of sanctions, but he does consider whether penalties should 
apply to all tax underpayments or only those that cross a particular 
aggressiveness threshold.77 Following the general deterrence litera-
ture, Logue refers to penalties that have this feature as “fault-based.”78 
I find this term unfortunate both because it introduces a moralistic 
overtone into a purely technical analysis and (relatedly) because its 
use may lead to a confusion between aggressiveness and culpability. 
In any case, Logue does not reach clear conclusions regarding the de-
sirability of fault-based sanctions. 79  Mark Gergen also finds fault-
based penalties plausible, but only if cross-cutting psychological biases  
  
                                                                                                                  
 72. See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring In-
formation About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 111-13 
(1990). 
 73. Id. at 96. 
 74. Endless harmful tax-motivated acts are perfectly legal. A worker who reduces his 
or her work hours to avoid extra taxes, an investor who retains an unwanted appreciated 
asset to avoid the tax on the gain, an elderly taxpayer who engages in extra consumption in 
order to avoid the looming estate tax all engage in socially harmful yet perfectly legal  
activities. 
 75. See id. at 112. 
 76. Lawsky, supra note 12, at 1054. 
 77. See Logue, supra note 6, at 257-64. 
 78. Id. at 241.  
 79. Moreover, Logue’s analysis relies on a problematic concept of “transaction.” Id. at 
279, 280 n.70. The problems with relying on this concept are clear from David P. Hariton, 
The Frame Game: How Defining the “Transaction” Decides the Case, 31 VA. TAX REV. 221, 
221-34, 266-70 (2011). Logue is not the only one relying on a transaction-by-transaction eval-
uation of aggressive tax positions. See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 60, at 1726 (basing the 
model on “the value of the transaction in absence of the tax benefit”). 
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and diverging subjective evaluations of legal uncertainty affect the 
outcomes in a particular way. 80  Furthermore, Gergen’s normative 
framework is unique and emphasizes the value of moderation.81 
Daniel Shaviro generally advocates against fault-based penalties 
(and, necessarily, against aggressiveness-based graduation). 82  His 
analysis, however, only explains why a penalty multiplier needed to 
offset uncertain detection should apply regardless of the degree of legal 
uncertainty.83 He mentions that it may be desirable to vary penalties 
based on “whether the transaction, even if potentially legally defensi-
ble, has a significant tax avoidance aspect.”84 However, he does not 
elaborate, and a plausible interpretation of “significant tax avoidance 
aspect” as a reference to aggressiveness appears to contradict his ear-
lier conclusion.85 In any case, Shaviro does not investigate why taxpay-
ers take uncertain positions in the first place, let alone positions of 
varying aggressiveness. 
The most illuminating work on legal uncertainty outside of tax was 
done by Richard Craswell and John Calfee thirty years ago. 86  Not 
much progress has occurred since then. Craswell and Calfee focused 
on whether legal uncertainty leads to over- or under-deterrence in the 
presence of an optimal legal rule. Their conclusions are indeterminate, 
with over-deterrence resulting from some assumptions and under-de-
terrence from others. Given these findings, and recognizing that  
socially optimal rules may not be plausibly assumed in tax and many  
  
                                                                                                                  
 80. See Gergen, supra note 6, at 284. 
 81. See id. at 255. 
 82. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 239-41. 
 83. Id. at 240. Shaviro’s further claim that a multiplier reflecting detection uncertainty 
leads to optimal penalties, id. at 240, cannot be sustained in the welfarist framework for the 
reasons I have previously discussed, see Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law 
and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2013). This claim is also questionable in the com-
plete deterrence framework because Shaviro does not address the variation of taxpayer’s 
private costs for positions of various aggressiveness. 
 84. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 244. 
 85. Id. Note that “significant tax avoidance aspect” may equally plausibly refer to cul-
pability (the taxpayer’s purpose for entering into a transaction or taking a return position) 
rather than aggressiveness. 
 86. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deter-
rence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). 
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other settings, it should be clear why Craswell and Calfee’s research 
has not led to many conceptual advances, including in the tax enforce-
ment literature.87 
In sum, people often face uncertain rules. Legal uncertainty is not 
random. It may not be eliminated by learning the law or soliciting ex-
pert advice. Instead, actors facing legal uncertainty may vary the ag-
gressiveness of their positions by adjusting their actions. The analysis 
of legal uncertainty and the incentives it creates is central to thinking 
about aggressiveness-based penalty graduation. The explicit link be-
tween statutory tax fines and the tax position’s aggressiveness makes 
this analysis even more important in the tax setting. Yet the literature 
has had very limited success in modeling legal uncertainty and ana-
lyzing aggressiveness-based sanctions. I model this uncertainty and 
make some progress toward understanding rational decision-making 
under uncertain, non-optimal legal rules in related work, including in 
a joint project with Scott Baker.88 Yet clearly, much more needs to be 
done in thinking about aggressiveness-based penalty graduation. 
B.   Magnitude: Clear Insights, Attainable Improvements 
In contrast with aggressiveness, magnitude-based variation of 
sanctions follows easily from the basic model of tax enforcement and, 
more generally, from the theory of complete (or absolute) deterrence. 
Using tax as a convenient example, the basic argument is simple and 
intuitive. Taxpayer’s incentives in choosing the magnitude of an un-
derpayment are obvious: the greater the magnitude, the greater the 
taxpayer’s gain. In a world without legal uncertainty (the world that 
we may properly assume for the purposes of investigating graduation 
based on magnitude alone), every tax underpayment is illegal. If we 
posit that all illegal acts are undesirable (a big assumption that  
generally underlies the tax enforcement and complete deterrence lit-
eratures and that I do not question here), we would want to eliminate  
all of them.89 Denying all gains from tax evasion eliminates the incen-
tive to evade, so a sanction equal to the private gain (the tax saved) 
assures compliance. The same logic applies to theft, fraud, and any   
                                                                                                                  
 87. The tax-specific inquiries by Gergen, Lawsky, Logue, and Shaviro just discussed 
post-date Craswell and Calfee’s work but find no way to build on their analysis. 
 88. See Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 
2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731356; Scott Baker & Alex 
Raskolnikov, Illusory Risk Preferences (working paper on file with author). 
 89. Of course, this conclusion changes once the costs of eliminating taxpayers’ gains are 
considered. 
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other offense analyzed in the complete deterrence framework with its 
gain-based sanctions.90 The greater the gain, the greater the sanc-
tion—this is magnitude-based graduation. 
All of this is well known, uncontroversial, and consistent with the 
actual sanctions calculated as a percentage of the tax due. But it does 
not explain a further graduation where this percentage increases with 
the magnitude of the underpayment. To my knowledge, this extra de-
gree of graduation has been neither analyzed nor justified. 
This shortcoming may be remedied. One only needs to replace the 
standard model’s fixed penalty coefficient with a variable coefficient 
that is a function of the tax underpayment or income understatement. 
This change will lead to somewhat more complicated math. But most 
results currently available in the literature can probably be restated 
and reinterpreted taking this additional complication into account. In 
fact, a recent article has already started down this path.91 I by no 
means suggest that no interesting insights will emerge.92 After all, tax 
scholars know well that a seemingly slight change in the penalty cal-
culation may lead to an important change in the model’s prediction.93 
But there is little doubt that the magnitude-based graduation of a kind 
found in the Internal Revenue Code can be readily incorporated into 
the existing models. Whether the revised models will support the spe-
cific magnitude-dependent sanctions found in the tax law and some 
other enforcement regimes is another matter. 
C.   Culpability: A Long-Standing Challenge 
The picture is less bright when we turn to the next axis of gradua-
tion—culpability. Here, tax enforcement scholars are in large com-
pany. The entire law and economics literature has struggled to explain 
why so many legal rules incorporate the mental state of a putative of-
fender, be it the mens rea requirement of the criminal law, the “willful 
breach” doctrine of the contract law, or the references to knowledge, 
purpose, and good faith in a variety of regulatory regimes from envi-
ronmental to securities regulation, corporate governance, and taxa-
tion. It is revealing that the chapter on public enforcement of law in 
                                                                                                                  
 90. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 
87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: 
The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 552 (1989). 
 91. See Mark D. Phillips, Deterrence vs. Gamesmanship: Taxpayer Response to Targeted 
Audits and Endogenous Penalties, 100 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 81, 85 (2014). 
 92. Mark Phillips’ article introduces a model that is dramatically more complicated 
than the standard model of tax evasion, see id., so it is difficult to isolate the effects of making 
the penalty rate a function of the evaded amount. 
 93. I refer, of course, to Shlomo Yitzhaki’s adjustment to the seminal Allingham-
Sandmo model. For a summary, see Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 48, at 1430. 
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the Handbook of Law and Economics makes no mention of the of-
fender’s mental states despite inquiring into such subjects as social 
norms and fairness considerations.94 
In a certain sense, the economic importance of a taxpayer’s mental 
state is obvious to any public finance economist. The fundamental cost 
of taxation—its excess burden—depends on that mental state. If a tax-
payer decides to work an hour less without taking taxes into account, 
no excess burden arises; otherwise it does. But this basic insight does 
not come close to justifying the culpability-based penalty graduation. 
All sorts of tax-motivated acts are perfectly legal.95 In some cases, such 
as a tax-motivated reduction in the work effort, outlawing tax-moti-
vated behavior is simply impossible.96 In other instances, such as cor-
porate inversions, making tax-driven transactions illegal is possible. 
Yet it is often not done in practice, and it is unclear whether it should 
be done in many cases.97 Moreover, the basic argument about excess 
burden loses much of its force if the tax system under consideration is 
not close to the optimal one. Pretty much every real tax system fits 
this description.98 In sum, the economic analysis of tax enforcement 
sheds little light on the culpability-based penalty graduation, at least 
at present. 
D.   Effort: Some Findings, Few Clear Results 
Tax penalties also vary based on a taxpayer’s effort to understand 
the law, including by obtaining legal advice. A taxpayer who “fails to 
make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction” 
that seems too good to be true is subject to a negligence penalty.99 A 
taxpayer who “does not exercise reasonable diligence to determine the 
correctness of a return position” is penalized for disregard of rules or 
regulations.100 On the other hand, if a taxpayer obtains advice of a 
qualified professional, that taxpayer is often viewed as having “good 
cause” to underpay taxes, no matter how aggressive the offending tax 
                                                                                                                  
 94. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6. For an argument that intent plays a key role 
in the economic analysis of a particular category of socially undesirable acts, see Raskolni-
kov, supra note 27. 
 95. Here I address taxes enacted to raise revenue rather than to regulate conduct (i.e., 
Pigouvian taxes). 
 96. I have called this the “undeterrability problem.” See Raskolnikov, supra note 83, at 
543. 
 97. Corporate inversions, for instance, may be reducing an inefficient corporate income 
tax. 
 98. For an expanded discussion, see Raskolnikov, supra note 83, at 566-89. 
 99. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2003). 
 100. Id. § 1.6662-3(b)(2). 
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position happens to be.101 In other words, lack of effort leads to penal-
ties, and evidence of effort protects from penalties, especially if that 
effort manifests itself through obtaining expert advice. That, at least, 
is the basic scheme. 
But there are complications. First, taxpayers may use reliance on 
expert advice as a defense against sanctions only if the reliance is rea-
sonable.102 If a taxpayer knows enough about tax to realize that the 
advice is too good to be true, the penalty protection is off. Ignorance is, 
indeed, bliss in this case. Second, tax advisors are subject to their own 
sanctions.103 A recent trend has been to regulate tax advisors more 
stringently and to make some forms of advice more expensive.104 As-
suming the advisors pass some of their costs to the clients, these de-
velopments create a disincentive to obtain advice. Third, a taxpayer is 
not liable for criminal (and perhaps even civil) tax fraud unless that 
taxpayer violates a “known legal duty.”105 A good faith subjective belief 
that no such duty (to pay tax) exists—no matter how unreasonable—
is a complete defense.106 The resulting incentive to not know the law is 
obvious. In sum, the U.S. tax system provides a set of complicated and 
inconsistent incentives to understand the law. But there is no doubt 
that sanctions depend on this effort. 
Does economic theory support such effort-based penalty gradua-
tion? The good news is that, unlike for aggressiveness- and culpability-
based graduation, models of resolving legal uncertainty through learn-
ing do exist. The bad news, however, is that the models’ implications 
are inconclusive. 
Paul Beck and Woon-Oh Jung find that taxpayer incentives to pur-
chase advisory services increase with tax rate, penalty rate, and audit 
probability (for realistic audit rates).107 These findings do not tell us 
whether compliance or welfare is likely to increase with the purchase 
of legal advice. Suzanne Scotchmer concludes that if the government 
can base its audit policies on taxpayer’s receipt of advice, it may (or 
may not) be optimal for taxpayers to resolve some—but never all—un-
certainty.108 In a related paper, Scotchmer finds that if penalties and 
audit probabilities do not depend on whether tax advice is sought, the 
                                                                                                                  
 101. See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 23, ¶ 7B.03. 
 102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)-(c)(as amended in 2003). 
 103. I.R.C. § 6694 (2012). 
 104. See generally David Weisbach & Brian Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Ad-
visers, 130 TAX NOTES 1279 (2011). 
 105. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). 
 106. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, ¶¶ 114.6, 114.9 (civil fraud and criminal 
fraud). 
 107. Beck & Jung, supra note 50, at 15-16. 
 108. See Scotchmer, supra note 52, at 53-54, 54 fig.2. 
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government revenue may (or may not) go down when taxpayers seek 
advice, but social welfare is likely to go up because taxpayers will bear 
less risk.109 Given the significant problems with evaluating welfare 
gains from adjusting the actual tax rules and sanctions,110 even the 
latter finding is uncertain. 
Several articles investigate the role of tax preparers in a game-the-
oretic setting. Beck, Davis, and Jung describe a signaling model in 
which a taxpayer’s decision to obtain legal advice conveys unique in-
formation to the IRS.111 The relationship between advice-seeking and 
government revenue is ambiguous, however, and the assumptions 
used to identify this relationship are strong.112 Graetz, Reinganum, 
and Wilde study a game involving taxpayers who may take uncertain 
positions, tax advisors who may not only resolve the legal uncertainty 
but protect taxpayers from penalties by issuing tax opinions, and a 
revenue-maximizing tax agency.113 They reach interesting results with 
very limited practical significance.114 They also discuss inconclusive 
findings of related research by Jennifer Reinganum and Louis 
Wilde.115 Nahum Melumad and colleagues investigate the deductibil-
ity of fees paid for tax advice and conclude that “in spite of the simplic-
ity of the setting considered, the efficiency implication of allowing the 
[deduction] . . . is rather ambiguous.”116 
In a more recent work, Kate Krause investigates the problem facing 
a taxpayer deciding whether to take a tax credit while being unsure 
                                                                                                                  
 109. Suzanne Scotchmer, The Effect of Tax Advisors on Tax Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER 
COMPLIANCE 182, 184 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989). The conclusion is subject 
to many caveats and is reached while assuming that advice is costless. See id. at 186-89. 
 110. See Raskolnikov, supra note 83, at 582-85. 
 111. Paul J. Beck et al., The Role of Tax Practitioners in Tax Reporting: A Signalling 
Game (Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, Faculty Working Paper No. 89-1578, 1989), 
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/30116/roleoftaxpractit1578beck.pdf? 
sequence=2. 
 112. The authors assume that both the tax agency and tax advisors know the true tax 
liability and that the taxpayers who hire advisors never conceal evasion from them and never 
choose to file their own returns inconsistently with the tax advice received. Id. at 4-5. All 
these assumptions strengthen the information content of the signal provided to the govern-
ment by the presence of an advisor—a key feature of the model. 
 113. See Graetz et al., supra note 61. 
 114. For instance, one of their results obtains if the tax agency audits all returns with 
risky positions; another if taxpayers are evenly distributed with respect to the likelihood 
that the deduction would be allowed on audit; and yet another depends on conditioning au-
dits on the presence of a tax opinion (something the IRS cannot do because these opinions 
are almost never disclosed on the return and are often protected by attorney-client privilege). 
Id. at 3. 
 115. See id. at 1-2. 
 116. Nahum D. Melumad et al., Should Taxpayers Be Subsidized to Hire Third-Party 
Preparers? A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 11 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 553, 555 (1994). 
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about eligibility and aware of potential IRS errors.117 She concludes 
that the IRS may (or may not) maximize its revenue by incentivizing 
some taxpayers to become informed.118 As is the case with Scotchmer’s 
analysis, several assumptions weaken this already equivocal conclu-
sion.119 Kaplow considers whether incentives to acquire information 
and resolve uncertainty about true taxable income are likely to be so-
cially excessive, in a sense of exceeding the incentives of uninformed 
taxpayers.120 He finds that they are if the penalty exceeds a fine based 
on the well-known multiplier (something that almost never happens 
in practice).121 Otherwise, the incentives may be excessive or not.122 
Limited empirical research suggests that involving an accountant or a 
tax attorney in return preparation increases tax underpayments sig-
nificantly.123 None of this suggests that we should penalize taxpayers 
for failing to learn the tax law and for declining to hire advisors. 
Finally, an effort to understand the law may affect future tax com-
pliance: once a taxpayer understands a rule in a given tax year, the 
taxpayer knows that rule for all future years. Are effort-based penal-
ties justified by these benefits of greater knowledge? To answer this 
question, we need to decide whether knowledge of the law is socially 
desirable. Here, tax is different from most other regulatory regimes.124 
These other regimes aim to induce actors to respond to the incentives 
that the regimes create. If a given regulatory regime is socially desir-
able, so is the knowledge of this regime by its subjects. Tax law also 
creates incentives, but these are distortions that efficiency-minded pol-
icymakers should try to minimize.125 Thus it is not obvious that we 
should incentivize taxpayers to understand the tax law. 
David Weisbach and Kaplow each elaborate on this intuition.126 
Weisbach’s analysis proceeds at a high level of generality. He considers 
                                                                                                                  
 117. See Krause, supra note 6, at 396. 
 118. Id. at 408, 410-11. 
 119. These include the assumption that the IRS is indifferent between revenue collected 
from ineligible taxpayers and eligible taxpayers taxed due to an IRS mistake, see id. at 406, 
and the assumption that taxpayers always follow the law despite imperfect detection (once 
they learn what the law requires, that is), see id. at 398. 
 120. See Kaplow, supra note 50, at 61. 
 121. Given probability of detection p, that multiplier in the tax setting is equal to  
(1-p)/p. For the analysis, see id. at 75. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Brian Erard, Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax Prac-
titioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 164-68, 166 tbl.1, 191 (1993). 
 124. Again, I am not discussing Pigouvian taxes here. 
 125. See Raskolnikov, supra note 83, at 543; David A. Weisbach, Is Knowledge of the Tax 
Law Socially Desirable?, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 187, 187 (2013). 
 126. See Kaplow, supra note 50, at 70-77; Weisbach, supra note 125, at 187.  
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uniform commodity taxes, non-linear labor income taxes, and tax shel-
ters in a stylized form. Even at that level, he finds it difficult to reach 
clear conclusions, especially if taxes are not assumed to be optimal. 
Kaplow’s results are similarly indeterminate.127 Whether knowledge of 
the actual federal income tax is socially desirable remains an open 
question. So incentives to acquire this knowledge do not appear to sup-
port penalties based on the effort to understand the law. 
What can we conclude about the effort-based penalty graduation? 
Taxpayers’ knowledge of the law presents the government with a co-
nundrum. Greater knowledge may be desirable if it leads to greater 
compliance, though even in this case the costs may outweigh the ben-
efits. Greater knowledge is probably undesirable if it helps taxpayers 
to reduce their taxes by taking more aggressive positions or finding 
opportunities to game the rules, though even here some ambiguity re-
mains.128 Some of the complexity of the real-life knowledge-related 
rules may well be due to this conundrum. But economic research has 
not approached the level of detail where this conundrum is relevant. 
For now, economic models provide little support for effort-based grad-
uation of sanctions. 
E.   Detection: A Continuing Inquiry 
Detection uncertainty is at the center of the economic analysis of 
deterrence. It features prominently in Gary Becker’s seminal analysis 
of crime129 and in Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo’s founda-
tional model of tax evasion.130 The penalty adjustment needed to ac-
count for detection uncertainty is well known: the so-called damages 
multiplier.131 It is also well known that the standard multiplier has a 
fundamental flaw. The probability of detection often increases with the 
aggressiveness of the violation, making any fixed multiplier non-opti-
mal.132 For instance, it is both intuitive and highly likely that egre-
gious speeding is more likely to be detected than a slight speed limit 
violation. For that reason, the optimal deterrence analysis suggests 
                                                                                                                  
 127. See Kaplow, supra note 50, at 72-73. 
 128. Gaming clearly inefficient taxes may be welfare-increasing after all. 
 129. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176-79, 176 n.12 (1968). 
 130. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 49, at 326-27, 327 n.2, 330-32. 
 131. In the general optimal deterrence literature where the optimal sanction equals the 
external harm, the multiplier is the inverse of the probability of detection, p. See Richard 
Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999). In tax evasion models, the payment (including tax) reflecting the 
detection uncertainty is the tax multiplied by (1-p)/p. See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 
48, at 1430; Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. 
PUB. ECON. 201, 201 (1974). 
 132. See Craswell, supra note 131, at 2193-94. 
2016]  SIX DEGREES OF GRADUATION 1039 
 
 
that fines for the former should be lower than for the latter—the exact 
opposite of what actually occurs. This is a persisting puzzle in the law 
and economics literature. 
Here, however, tax analysts get a rare break. In contrast with 
speeding and many other offenses, aggressiveness and ease of detec-
tion are not related in tax. Very aggressive tax positions (such as a 
failure to report tip income) may be almost undetectable while less ag-
gressive positions (such as deductions from known tax shelters) may 
be relatively easy for the government to find. Thus, the main optimal 
deterrence complication with accounting for detection uncertainty 
does not arise in the tax setting. Plenty of other complications exist, 
however. 
Probability of detection varies dramatically from one tax return 
item to another. Income understatements are certain to be identified 
if income is subject to information reporting but are much more diffi-
cult to detect otherwise. Undeclared income not subject to information 
reporting is less detectable than many deduction overstatements, 
which themselves vary in detectability. For a given deduction, the size 
of the overstatement affects the ease of detection. Items subject to 
mandatory disclosure have a different probability of detection than 
items that are not required to be disclosed. The detection probability 
varies among the disclosed items as well, depending on whether the 
required disclosure is on a case-by-case or the aggregate basis.133 
These nuances have received some attention in the literature, but 
progress has been slow. Over two decades ago, Steven Klepper and 
Daniel Nagin offered a model of taxpayer decision-making based on 
the assumption that the perceived probability of detection varies 
across different lines of a tax return.134 They found that actual taxpay-
ers strongly respond to these variations.135 This line of research is 
promising, but it has seen only a limited development thus far.136 Sim-
ilarly limited is the analysis of the relationship between the detection 
likelihood and the size of the tax understatement—whether absolute137 
or relative.138 Recent articles introduce a detection probability that 
                                                                                                                  
 133. The case-by-case disclosures are required for the so-called listed and reportable 
transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended 2010). The aggregate disclosure is 
required for uncertain tax items reportable on Schedule UTP. See generally J. Richard Har-
vey Jr., Schedule UTP - Why So Few Disclosures?, 139 TAX NOTES 69 (2013).  
 134. See Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
1, 2 (1989). 
 135. See id. at 22. 
 136. For one of a very few relatively recent papers, see Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark 
Rider, Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 51 (2005). 
 137. See Yitzhaki, supra note 70, at 123-24. 
 138. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and 
the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 571-72 (2006). 
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varies with income into the basic tax evasion model139 and study the 
effects of mandatory140 and voluntary disclosure of uncertain tax posi-
tions. 141  There is some empirical evidence supporting the recent  
models.142 
Overall, there is a solid economic foundation for incorporating the 
detection variations into the analysis of sanctions. Actual tax penalties 
reflect the basic theoretical point that difficult-to-detect violations 
should be subject to higher penalties. More research is needed to make 
the models more realistic and to produce more nuanced empirical esti-
mates. But no conceptually insurmountable problems appear to exist, 
and the continuing scholarly interest in the subject is encouraging. 
F.   History: A Persistent Puzzle 
Finally, most sanctions increase with the number of previous of-
fenses. From the so-called three-strikes laws adopted by many U.S. 
states143 to the special chapter of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines dedi-
cated to the subject,144 history-based graduation of sanctions is per-
haps the most widespread and widely known feature of punishment 
regimes. Equally well known in the law and economics literature is the 
fact that history-based graduation is very difficult to explain. In the 
words of Winand Emons who has studied this issue for some time, “At 
the very best the literature . . . has shown that under rather special 
circumstances escalating penalty schemes may be optimal.”145 At the 
same time, plausible arguments suggest that optimal sanctions should 
decline with an increase in the number of previous offenses, especially 
                                                                                                                  
 139. See Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a 
Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 652-54 (2011). 
 140. See Mills et al., supra note 60, at 1722-24. 
 141. See Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure, supra note 58, at 245-47; Lisa De Simone et 
al., When Are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs Mutually Beneficial?, 88 
ACCT. REV. 1971, 1975-76 (2013). 
 142. See Paul J. Beck & Petro Lisowsky, Tax Uncertainty and Voluntary Real-Time Tax 
Audits, 89 ACCT. REV. 867, 898-99 (2014). 
 143. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2001). 
 144. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 145. Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders, 23 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 253, 254 (2003). 
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for regulatory offenses such as tax law violations.146 Most likely, expla-
nations for the history-based graduation lie outside the economic anal-
ysis of law. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
What follows from identifying six degrees of sanction graduation 
and reviewing their economic rationales? Sanctions can be highly com-
plex. Many real-life sanctions are quite complex. This complexity is 
underappreciated in legal discourse and under-conceptualized in eco-
nomic theory. If one thinks that sanctions create real-world incentives, 
there is much to examine and explain. 
It may be tempting to suggest that behavioral law and economics is 
the most promising area of future research. I am somewhat skeptical. 
Once we start incorporating the nuances of human psychology into the 
rational actor model, it becomes implausible to analyze sanctions at 
large. For example, both speeding fines and prison sentences depend 
on the aggressiveness of a violation. But it is quite obvious that people 
think about these two sanctioning regimes in very different terms. So 
it is both understandable and appropriate that the most recent com-
prehensive volume on behavioral law and economics does not have a 
chapter on the general behavioral analysis of sanctions.147 In contrast, 
insights from the standard economic theory are more likely to apply 
across many different legal regimes. Thus, the payoffs from developing 
further insights using the basic rational actor model are significant. 
One of the payoffs is to identify areas where sanctions complexity 
may be unnecessary, or at least excessive. Overly complicated sanc-
tions are socially costly just as overly complicated rules are. In fact, 
sanctions are particularly costly because they apply to violations of 
many different legal rules. So we should pay special attention to sanc-
tions complexity. Does it make sense to have a penalty that varies 
along five different dimensions? Why have fines that give rise to in-
centives that we do not clearly understand, let alone intend? Recogniz-
ing six degrees of sanctions graduation—both in theory and in prac-
tice—illuminates our thinking about these and many other questions 
of legal punishment. 
 
  
                                                                                                                  
 146. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offend-
ers, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 737-39 (2001). 
 147. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal  
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